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One of the most discussed subjects in the economic circles during the last few years 
has been the fiscal performance of the eurozone. In 1999, eleven members of the Euro-
pean Union joined in a common monetary union, which aimed to introduce a new cur-
rency in the near future. Greece joined the group as the 12
th
 member in 2001, thus creat-
ing the original twelve users of euro as their currency. Seven more members have since 
joined the monetary union. The signatories have thereby transferred their monetary con-
trol to the European Central Bank, based in Frankfurt am Main in Germany. Although 
maintaining the national central banks as supervising offices in respective member 
countries, the ECB effectively functions as the sole monetary authority for the 19 euro-
zone member countries. The fiscal side of the national budgetary measures, however, 
remains in the hands of the national governments. One of the most recent discussions 
concerns the need for a common fiscal union as well, although this option, if imple-
mented, is still in the early stages of consideration. 
We have also read about worsening debt and deficit ratios in the media, while the ef-
fects of the prolonged financial crisis still prevail, and the European Central Bank main-
tains its stimulation trend. Financial collapse, originating in the subprime lending pro-
cedures among financial institutions, started in 2008 and led to numerous shutdowns 
and takeovers. Many sovereign nations were obliged or chose to take control and aid 
these troubled institutions. Partly due to these measures, the national debt and deficit 
levels deteriorated significantly, with many eurozone countries as famous examples. As 
the role of the ECB is quite exceptional in the world, and without an equivalent entity, 
the concept of common monetary policy is facing a severe test. After all, for a currency 
union of this scale, a helpful precedent case is hardly available. A fruitful ground for 
widespread research and writing, the crisis is proving to be a lesson that provides im-
portant experience in light of all future monetary cooperation. 
The financial crisis provides a significant turn of events in this thesis, but is only one 
side of the coin. The crisis has put some enormous stress on national budgets, yet the 
national policy makers and treasuries are obliged to follow the common fiscal rules of 
the monetary union. As stated before, the management of the fiscal architecture has 
been the task of respective union members. The restrictions are mostly based on the 
Maastricht Treaty, effective since November 1993. The Treaty was later supplemented 
by the Treaties of Amsterdam in 1999, Nice in 2003 and Lisbon in 2009, as well as the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1998. All dates refer to years of the Treaties becom-
ing effective. The Treaty of Maastricht provides several so-called convergence criteria, 
which aim to guide national fiscal policies. Of these criteria, this thesis include the re-
strictions on national debt and deficit, which we get to know better in the next chapter. 
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Other criteria that the Treaty defines are commitments to Harmonized Indices of Con-
sumer Prices (HICP), cooperation in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM and ERM II) 
and interest rates on government bonds. 
Derived from these first words, we aim to answer the following question in the the-
sis: How have the national debt and deficit levels developed before and after the mone-
tary union membership, and have the fiscal restrictions been followed? Moreover, we 
complement this with an additional question: Has the development and handling of pub-
lic debt and deficit in the eurozone given indication that the fiscal restrictions should be 
stressed even further? In addition to debt and deficit paths, we supplement this question 
by providing factors and answers behind the direction of the debt and deficit paths. The 
research question, as well as this work, is divided in three parts. The first one, in form of 
chapter two, comprises the theoretical frame of reference behind the Economic and 
Monetary Union. After a short introducing part, we take a closer look at the Maastricht 
Treaty and its message, as well as the Stability and Growth Pact that was designed to 
create better and more distinct fiscal complement for the member nations. The part of 
guiding Treaties is concluded by the Fiscal Compact, the most recent larger agreement 
from 2013. In the first actual chapter we also view some theories that aim to provide 
rationale for the fiscal restrictions. We consider these theories to the extent they suit the 
subject of the thesis. Although having its intentional origins within the Delors Commis-
sion in the 1980s, we consider it useful to view the euro area as a general theoretical 
currency area as well. 
The second part of the thesis consists of empirical observations based on data accu-
mulated from the Eurostat database. We have gathered observations regarding debt and 
deficit values for each Eurozone country, which we observe through important dates 
and events in the timeline of European monetary cooperation. The observations mainly 
focus on the period of membership in the eurozone, but some years prior to the entry 
have also been included as a means of comparison. For the twelve members, the period 
of observation starts from 1993 when the Treaty of Maastricht became effective, signal-
ing increased attention to the details of the Treaty. For the seven newer members the 
observations start from a later date, but also include some years before the entries. After 
all, it is these values from earlier periods which draw attention in terms of eligibility to 
participate. Furthermore, we also consider some European Union members which have 
the potential to become eurozone members in the near future. No official entry dates 
have been set, but some EU members have expressed interest in joining the EMU 
around the year 2020, as also described in the ERM. 
The thesis is summed up by chapter four, which aims to interpret the results and 
draw an opinion on the usefulness of the fiscal constraints. The purpose of this work is 
to also provide better insight for the reader regarding European fiscal and monetary 
framework. We aim to clarify the rules and procedures behind the Eurosystem, and the 
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mechanisms that require the currency area to function the way it does.  After reading 
this thesis, the reader hopefully understands better the attention given to the debt and 




2 OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UN-
ION 
 
The Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union is the supranational ex-
pression of the unified European monetary area. Whereas the monetary guidance and 
authority has been placed upon the European Central Bank (ECB), the fiscal policy 
making rests on the shoulders of the individual national governments. This division 
forms the main theme and point of attention of the thesis, since conducting independent 
fiscal policy provides certain different opportunities, depending on how the monetary 
authority conducts its tasks. This chapter, namely chapter 2, forms the theory part of the 
thesis as we get to know the fiscal features of the Economic and Monetary Union. The 
fiscal and monetary tasks were divided when the common currency area began to form, 
with the currency area authorities aiming to provide codes of conduct for the fiscal side 
as well. These guidelines come in the form of different Treaties and agreements, which 
we shall look over in the first subchapter. We take a look at the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Stability and Growth Pact, as well as the most recent addition, the Fiscal Compact, 
which entered into force in 2013. The Fiscal Compact is the fiscal part of the new Trea-
ty on Stability, Coordination and Convergence (TSCG). The second part of the first 
chapter consists of two models that we hope will clarify the role of fiscal restrictions in 
the eurozone. 
The eurozone itself consists of 19 members, out of 28 that currently participate in the 
European Union. At the time of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the 
union consisted of the following twelve members:  
 
Table 1: Original signatories of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Source: Author’s own 
work based on European Union, About the EU (2016). 
 
Member Joined Currency Euro Member Joined Currency Euro 
Belgium Founder Belgian franc yes Italy Founder Italian lira yes 
Denmark 1973 Danish krona no Luxembourg Founder Luxembourgish franc yes 
France Founder French franc yes Netherlands Founder Dutch guilder yes 
Germany Founder German mark yes Portugal 1986 Portuguese escudo yes 
Greece 1981 Greek drachma yes Spain 1986 Spanish peseta yes 






Table 2: Countries that have joined the European Union after the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Source: Author’s own work based on European Union, About the 
EU (2016) 
 
Member Joined Currency Euro Member Joined Currency Euro 
Austria 1995 Austrian schilling yes Latvia 2004 Latvian lats yes 
Bulgaria 2007 Bulgarian lev no Lithuania 2004 Lithuanian litas yes 
Croatia 2013 Croatian kuna no Malta 2004 Maltese lira yes 
Cyprus 2004 Cypriot pound yes Poland 2004 Polish zloty no 
Czech Republic 2004 Czech koruna no Romania 2007 Romanian leu no 
Estonia 2004 Estonian kroon yes Slovakia 2004 Slovak koruna yes 
Finland 1995 Finnish markka yes Slovenia 2004 Slovenian tolar yes 
Hungary 2004 Hungarian forint no Sweden 1995 Swedish krona no 
 
 
The union has since been complemented by additional sixteen members, illustrated in 
the table 2 above. The 19 EMU members are the main focus of the thesis, with the be-
havior of their debt and deficit levels in the center of the study. In the end, we intend for 
the passage of these variables to provide us an opinion on the need of fiscal restrictions, 
viewed before and after the respective entries of the member states. 
      
. 
 
2.1 FISCAL TREATIES OF THE MONETARY COMMUNITY 
 
Fiscal policy is a governmental act to guide the national economy using different op-
tions. This usually comes in the form of taxation and government spending, with which 
the political decision maker intends to influence the economy, often with the purpose of 
stabilizing economic activity in case of a business cycle. 
As noted in the introduction, the national governments remain in charge of fiscal pol-
icymaking, with a periodically elected body of politicians usually in charge of deci-
sions. Being a vast and powerful tool that carries far-reaching effects, it is clear that 
some form of coordinated rules for fiscal policy are needed. In the following, we view 
the most important ones in the EMU, namely the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and 
Growth Pact, and the Fiscal Compact, in order to better perceive the fiscal restrictions 
that concern the common European monetary stage. 
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2.1.1 The Maastricht Treaty 
 
Named after the Limburg capital, the Maastricht Treaty is the pre-eminent contract 
that guides fiscal policy-making in the eurozone. The Treaty was signed by the then 
twelve member states of the European community on February 7
th
, 1992, and entered 
into force on November 1
st
, 1993. Of the twelve signatories, Denmark and the United 
Kingdom would eventually continue with their respective currencies, whereas the euro-
zone would go on to accommodate nine new member states. Later, Sweden also chose 
not to participate. As of 2015, the 19 member states form an economic powerhouse of 
over 9 trillion euros in terms of GDP and 340 million inhabitants. The Maastricht Treaty 
is also known for creating the original three-pillar structure that led to the formation of 
the European Union, but in this chapter we focus mainly on the fiscal policy side. The 
Treaty is famous for its criteria, which every European Union country is obliged to fol-
low in order to be eligible to adopt the euro as their currency. We take a short look at 
the Treaty, since it provides us with a clear framework of how the applicants should 
conduct their fiscal policy in order to be eligible for the euro. 
As Baskaran (2009, 331) points out, the path to monetary integration was character-
ized by varying degrees of enthusiasm and expectation. Notably, as France favored 
monetary integration as a means to influence the politics of the German Central Bank, 
Germany feared that its main target of inflationary discipline would be ignored in the 





Figure 1: Inflation rates for selected Eurozone countries before the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Source: OECD Data (2015) 
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Germany famously preferred inflation target as the main objective, whereas the mon-
etary union would include many countries with a high level of inflation. Presented 
above is a table of inflation rates for selected countries before the implementation of the 
Maastricht Treaty over a five year period. We are able to conclude, that even though the 
inflation rate of Germany itself was slightly higher in the years before the Treaty, the 
rate was generally lower than many other future EMU countries. Greece, along with 
some other southern European countries suffered from high inflation rates in the past. 
To ease the anxiety of turbulent inflation rates, the Maastricht Treaty provided several 
convergence criteria which the European Union member states had to achieve before the 
start of the third phase of the EMU, namely the introduction of common currency. 
(Baskaran 2009, 331) 
In the center of the treaty are the Maastricht criteria. The criteria consist of five main 
sections that impose restrictions on national fiscal policies. In the Frankfurt based 
monetary authority, the national governments are tasked with maintaining a sustainable 
and healthy fiscal policy. The aim of the much debated criteria are to coordinate these 
fiscal policies, and this way ensure that the monetary cooperation is as smooth as possi-
ble. The five convergence criteria, as depicted in article 109(j) of the Treaty, are as fol-
lows. (Baskaran 2009, 331 & De Grauwe 2005, 143.): 
 
1) Inflation rate of the applicant must not be higher than 1,5% above the average 
of the three lowest inflation rates in the European Union member states. 
2) Long-term interest rate of the applicant must not be more than 2% higher than 
the average of these three low-inflation member states. 
3) The applicant country has to join the European Monetary System exchange 
rate mechanism and has not experienced a devaluation of its currency in the 
two years before entrance to the union. 
4) Budget deficit of the government must not be higher than 3% of the country’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). However, if the deficit is higher, an excep-
tion can be made if it is continuously declining and approaching the 3% val-
ue. An exception can also be made if the deviation from the required value is 
exceptional and temporary (Article 104c (a)). 
5) Government debt must not exceed 60% of GDP. Again, an exception is avail-
able if the value is decreasing and approaching the required level at a suffi-
cient speed (Article 104c (b)). 
 
Let us take a quick note of why these criteria were gathered and what they hold in-
side. As De Grauwe (2005, 142) observes, the Maastricht Treaty was unique in a sense, 
that it was carefully formulated and took a number of years to produce an acceptable 
document. In addition, it took ten years for the common currency to access circulation 
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after the ratification. For example, when the two Germanys united, it only took about 
six months for the Eastern part to merge into the Western counterpart. Let us note, how-
ever, that the Germanys were quite similar in many ways, even though the political sys-
tem differed somewhat. The European melting pot consists of numerous languages, 
identities, cultures and systems. 
In the preparation process, the designers heavily stressed macroeconomic factors. 
The background for this procedure is the fear that the future union would have to com-
bat a serious inflationary threat. With Germany on the controls, the inflation conver-
gence was added so the interested participants would have to accept it as well. A mone-
tary union is about forming a common central bank, which obviously implicates that the 
union contains preferences from every participating party. In a union of multiple mem-
bers, a country with lower inflation target has a chance to be in a minority position. A 
low-inflation country sacrifices some of its welfare by accepting a higher-inflation 
country as its partner. Do note, that a monetary union also holds gains, such as lower 
transaction costs and reduced risk. A participating country must carefully weigh, if the 
welfare losses indeed are lower than the efficiency gains. If this applies, it might be 
agreeable to form a monetary union with a higher-inflation country. In this light, the 
Maastricht Treaty is now clearer. A candidate must come forward with evidence, that 
they intend to battle inflation like the German Bundesbank. They also succeeded in do-
ing so, by bringing down their inflation rates at the expense of a temporary increase in 
unemployment. (De Grauwe 2005, 144-146.) 
The budgetary convergence requirements (3% deficit and 60% government debt) can 
be discussed in a similar manner. A high government debt tempts a national government 
to raise inflation. The reason is that some of the high-inflation country’s government 
bonds are of long term type. The interest rate of these bonds are fixed from earlier peri-
od, with forecasts on the coming inflation taken into account. If the member govern-
ment now suddenly creates inflation, the real values of the bonds take a downturn and 
the bondholders suffer unacceptably.  On the other side, the government gains. Derived 
from the previous section, a monetary union prompts a dilemma for the low-debt coun-
try. In the union, the low-debt country is accompanied by a high-debt country who has 
an incentive to raise inflation. This could be the case even if the countries have the same 
objective of lower inflation. Hence, as long as one country has a higher debt-to-GDP 
ratio, it is tempted to create a sudden rise in inflation. In conclusion, the lower-debt 
member is on the losing side and will demand that the higher-debt member reduces its 
debt before admission to the monetary union. To achieve this, the indebted country must 
reduce its budget deficit. When the deficit is cleared, the incentives to create sudden 
inflation disappear. This was the focus when the Maastricht Treaty was being drafted, 
since one of the main concerns of the coming union were the differences in the struc-
tures of potential members. (De Grauwe 2005, 146-148.) 
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Other reflections have also been brought to light, especially in the wake of the recent 
Eurozone crisis. Governments with a significant amount of debt are more likely to de-
fault than their lower-debt counterparts. This often leads to a threat of bailout if a de-
fault crisis occurs. Hence, the Maastricht Treaty also includes a no-bail out clause. The 
clause states that neither union members nor the ECB can be forced to bail out failing 
member countries. (De Grauwe 2005, 147.) 
The devaluation convergence is easy to interpret. If a country preforms a devaluation 
shortly before the admission to the union, it gains a depreciated exchange rate and there-
fore increases its competitiveness. Hence, joining the union requires the member to ful-
fill the criterion of not performing a devaluation in the two years before its admission. 
Rigidity regarding the fulfillment of the criterion has, however, changed significantly 
after the Treaty was signed. This derives from the unusual way the devaluation condi-
tion is presented in the Treaty. As De Grauwe (2005, 148) presents: “According to the 
Treaty, countries should maintain their exchange rates within the normal band of fluctu-
ation (without changing that band) during the two years preceding their entry into the 
EMU. At the moment of the signing of the Treaty, the normal band was 2 x 2,25%. 
Since August 1993, the normal band within the EMS was 2 x 15%, a considerably larg-
er band of fluctuation.” In case one of the outsiders, namely the United Kingdom, Swe-
den and Denmark, decides to join the union, the criterion will be much like for them, 
but not entirely identical to the above (De Grauwe 2005, 148). 
Last, we observe the interest rate rule. It is easy to understand the requirement, since 
large differences in interest rates before admission to the union are likely to cause sig-
nificant profits and losses. For example, country A is about to enter the union with an 
average long-term government bond rate of 5% while the equivalent for the Eurozone is 
4%. This leads to a situation where the rate between the euro and country A’s currency 
becomes fixed, creating tempting opportunities for arbitrage. Because the exchange rate 
is fixed, it is clear that obtaining higher profit currency A bonds and selling lower profit 
euro bonds would hold no risk. As an outcome, the arbitrage continues until the profit 
on euro and currency A bonds is equal. Furthermore, the decrease in the price of euro 
bonds and increase in the price of currency A bonds continue until the profits are even. 
As a significant number of euro bonds are owned by Eurozone banks, they also suffer 
harder. On the other side, the holders of currency A bonds, largely institutions from 
country A, make large profits. This quite likely leads to disorders in local capital mar-




2.1.2 The Stability and Growth Pact 
 
After the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, it quickly became apparent that 
additional measures were needed in order to control national budgets. Origins of the 
Pact lie in the German financial sector, which deemed that the political union in Europe 
would not be complete without some form of Maastricht follow-up. (Segers & van 
Esch, 2007, 1089-1090.) The success of the Pact can be regarded as contradictory, but it 
is useful to review it as well, since it supplements the original requirements laid down in 
the Maastricht Treaty. Together they outline the original fiscal stipulations of the deep-
ening European cooperation. 
In the heated years after the Maastricht Treaty, political and economic parties argued 
a stricter version of the Maastricht Treaty. Whereas the German Bundesbank and Ger-
many’s then minister of finance Theodor Waigel preferred stricter budgetary rules and 
additions to the Treaty, France and Italy opted for a more lenient way. Originally, the 
German proposal consisted of increasing the budget deficit clause to a single percentage 
point of the GDP and an automatic penalty on members who did not achieve the 3% 
limit. The penalty would have included a 0,25% sanction for every exceeding percent. 
The member would only be refunded if it managed to return to 3% limit in two years 
time. The proposal was ultimately unsuccessful, as the European Council has, as laid 
down in article 104C of the Maastricht Treaty, the final word over determining of the 
deficit rule. (Segers & van Esch, 2007, 1101-1103.) 
The Stability and Growth Pact is built on two components, namely the surveillance 
and dissuasive parts. First one is the surveillance part, which aims to intervene at the 
very beginning, if a member country shows signs of excessive deficit. The surveillance 
part consists of few features, which are worth mentioning. A member of the Eurozone is 
required to deliver a so called Stability Program, which reviews the actions of the public 
policy makers. It also presents a design to bring the budget back to balance or surplus. 
Furthermore, a revision of how this is achieved is included as well. (De Grauwe, 2005, 
229.) 
Programs submitted by the national policy makers are closely studied by the Europe-
an Council, which in turn gives its statement after consulting the European Commis-
sion. The verdict is based on the national budgetary measures. The main focus is, 
whether these measures provide satisfactory safety margins to avoid significant deficits 
or not. The provided national programs are closely followed by the Council, which can 
propose necessary corrections if the member country’s medium-term budgetary outlook 
differs substantially from its target. (De Grauwe, 2005, 229.) 
If a member country fails to deliver results, the dissuasive part of the SGP is activat-
ed. This could also come into question if significant deficits happen unexpectedly. The 
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concept of excessive deficit derives from the Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty. As 
mentioned before, the Article defines the deficit to be excessive if it surpasses the re-
quired value of 3% of GDP. An exception is that the deficit has happened suddenly and 
unexpectedly. In addition, the deficit value stays close to the required level. The Maas-
tricht Treaty, however, does not provide further clarifications to what is exceptional. 
This has been, to some extent, further explained in the Stability and Growth Pact. (De 
Grauwe, 2005, 229.) Also from De Grauwe’s work (2005, 229), a budget deficit can be 
regarded as exceptional if: 
 
1) The deficit is caused by an uncommon event that the member country has no 
control upon, such as a natural disaster. 
2) The deficit is caused by a significant economic downturn. This condition is 
filled if the decline in GDP is more than 2% during a single year. If this is the 
case, the Council concludes that the excessive deficit condition has no ground 
and the dissuasive policy is halted. If the single-year decrease in GDP is be-
tween 0,75% and 2%, the member in question is able to submit reasons why 
the deficit happened and this way rationalize the deficit. If the decrease in 
GDP is less than 0,75%, the member is not advised to appeal to the excep-
tionality clause. 
 
The Commission is again consulted by the Council, and a decision on whether there 
is excessive deficit or not, is given. If the Council concludes that excessive deficit has 
proof, a strict schedule follows. A serious counsel is made to the member state in ques-
tion, which states that measures to correct the deficit need to be taken in the following 
four months. If the country is unsuccessful, the Council issues a notice where it pro-
vides two more months to accept the needed measures. If the member is still unsuccess-
ful, sanctions are imposed within the next two months. Sanctions in question come in 
the form of non-interest bearing deposits to the Council. The sum of the deposit is ob-
tained from the following formula. (De Grauwe 2005, 229): 
 
Deposit = 0,2 + 0,1 x (Deficit – 3) 
 
All variables above are displayed as percent of Gross Domestic Product. Suppose an 
example where the member country is running a 5% deficit, the deposit penalty would 
be as follows: 
 
 
Deposit = 0,2 + 0,1 x (5 – 3) = 0,4 
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The country in question would have to provide a deposit of 0,3% of its GDP. The larg-
est possible deposit is 0,5% of GDP. It is easy to see, that in case the sanction could be 
imposed effectively, the amount required is substantial. For example, if France gener-
ates a GDP of around $2,85 trillion a year (2014), in case of unjustified 5% deficit it 
would be sanctioned a remarkable 11,4 billion. Furthermore, the sanction has a follow-
up rule. The country running a deficit has two years to correct its budget, otherwise the 
sanction becomes a permanent fine. If the member manages to bring its budgetary 
measures back to required level within two years, the initial deposit will be returned to 
the member. Even as a temporary measure, the fine would draw difficult consequences. 
(De Grauwe 2005, 229.) 
The beginning of the SGP proved to be problematic, leading to the Pact being re-
viewed in 2005. The main focus of the revision was to intervene with the pro-cyclical 
fiscal behavior of the members, including requiring the budgetary correction to be 
judged through its effects on the structural balance. Furthermore, public debt and sus-
tainability gained more attention in the revision, along with structural reform. One ma-
jor component was also the medium-term objective (MTO) of public finance, concern-
ing budget balance at the end of the stability and convergence schedule, which was 
changed to process members individually. The programs vary from the minimum of -1 
% of GDP for less indebted countries that possess high chance for economic growth, to 
budget balance or surplus in case of high-debt countries that lack potential for growth. 
(Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 609.) 
The SGP has also been condemned for being arbitrary and insufficient, because it 
largely ignores the systematic differences among the various EMU member states. Oth-
er subjects of criticism have emerged as well, including inflexibility concerning the 3% 
threshold and its role in regionwide policymaking. The limit is mostly independent of a 
specific country’s cyclical position, hence the SGP struggles to fulfill its stabilizing 
task. As remembered, the monetary policy can only be used to balance the EMU econ-
omy as a whole, not individually for each member. A member suffering from a down-
turn and a large deficit could even be forced to reduce the extent of fiscal policy as a 
result, even though an expansion would be more favorable. The criticism of the SGP 
also attains to automatic stabilizers, which many think should be allowed to function 
freely. This pertains to aggregate demand depending on disposable income. (Beetsma & 
Giuliodori, 2010 625-626.) 
If the SGP’s medium-term objectives are complied with, this usually indicates that 
the automatic stabilizers could function freely, with the 3% deficit limit staying intact as 
well. The economic crisis has, however, seriously complicated these efforts, or led to 
the members being even further from their targets. This in turn indicates that the margin 
for automatic stabilization, in addition to stabilization in the shape of fiscal policy, 
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should have been more restricted. Has this been the case in reality, remains somewhat a 
question. (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 626.) 
 
 
2.1.3 The Fiscal Compact 
 
The newest addition to the network of fiscal guidelines is the Fiscal Compact, the 
fiscal component of the new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG), 
which became effective in January 2013. The new agreement focuses mainly on 
strengthening the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact, derived from the les-
son provided by the financial crisis. Members are now required to provide a so-called 
Stability and Convergence Program (SCP), in addition to committing to reducing debt 
levels the way the European Commission deems most suitable. Members that are part of 
the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) are required to deliver their budgetary calcula-
tions and structural reform programs to the Commission, as well as to the European 
Council. These two will then provide advice and carefully supervise the usage of the 
budgets in question. (Menguy 2015, 228-229.) 
Moreover, the member states that surpass the 60% debt limit, are required to commit 
to a progression towards a predefined level. These countries can be seen to progress 
sufficiently, in case they have advanced towards the target a rate of 5% a year during 
the course of the last three years. In addition, every member state in the Excessive Defi-
cit Procedure is given a transitional period of three years following the amendment of 
the excessive deficit program, in order to avoid sudden alterations in the newly found 
positive debt paths. A more rigid institutional system was needed as well, in order to 
prevent speculative attacks against the indebtedness of certain eurozone countries. 
(Menguy 2015, 228-229.) 
Fiscal discipline was again stressed as a means to conduct common monetary inter-
ests in the currency area, since the political decision makers were still unwilling to for-
mally coordinate national budgetary measures. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
these indirect actions based on fiscal discipline were also seen to provide more room for 
long-term debt adjustments, and not only budget deficits. The new Fiscal Compact has 
also drawn criticism, since it appears to be quite ambitious in case of certain member 
states. Failure of these policy coordinations could prove to be harmful for the economy 
of the entire union. (Menguy 2015, 229.) 
Menguy (2015, 253) presents in her work, that the needed budgetary surplus for a 
country is an increasing function of its public debt level, fluctuation of the interest rate 
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of national bonds, the country’s relative size and the interest rate of foreign benchmark 
bonds. On the other hand, the needed surplus is a decreasing function of the country’s 
growth rate, the fluctuation of interest rates of foreign bonds and the foreign debt levels. 
A feature unique for a monetary union, it is difficult for a member to start conducting a 
more sustainable debt path, in case it has more debt than its partners in the first place. 
The same goes for a history of risky public bonds with a larger variance of past interest 
rates. If there is a given public target for debt levels, it is not automatically solid or self-
corrective for the member of a currency union, but instead needs to be low enough be-
cause of the stability of the debt path. A public debt target is solid only in the case of 
countries that have higher growth rates than the interest rate of public bonds for the un-
ion’s benchmark member. Similarly, a smaller debt target is more reasonable for a large 
country that has an unstable and risky financial situation. (Menguy 2015, 253-254.) 
 
2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR FISCAL RE-
STRICTIONS 
 
In the previous subchapter, we viewed some of the limitations imposed on the mem-
ber states of the Economic and Monetary Union. In the second, and final subchapter of 
the first chapter, we provide a rationale and a theoretical framework for proposing these 
restrictions. This comes in the form of two theories, which aim to illustrate how the 
team play between the respective actors of the monetary union works. After the sub-
chapter, we move to empirical illustration of the debt and deficit levels, in chapter 3. 
 
2.2.1 A Model by Beetsma and Giuliodori 
 
A frequent phenomenon among the Economic and Monetary Community has been 
the different ambitions between the community actors. Most common occurrence arises 
between the goals pursued by the central bank and the national fiscal policy makers. 
Often we have also read about adverse fiscal spillovers that cross borders and affect 
other member countries. These two disorders could provide the incentive to call into 
play the fiscal limitations on national policies. (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 616.) 
The original OCA theory presented by Mundell mostly omits the effects of monetary 
union on the fiscal decision making. As already mentioned, the fiscal side remains the 
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task of national governments, which may proceed to conduct this policy in a way that is 
most suitable for them. Joining a currency union produces a blend of fiscal and mone-
tary policies that affect each other, with outcomes that also affect the macroeconomic 
side. Therefore, it is not surprising that a common setting for conduct among the mone-
tary and fiscal authorities in the European monetary community is needed. Main con-
stituents in the European blend include the respective interests of different authorities, 
their capacities to carry out decisions in a cooperative way and the timing of these deci-
sions, as well as the possibility for the European Central bank to include the budget re-
strictions in its policymaking. (Beetsma & Giuliodori, 2010, 616.) 
As the friction between the central bank and national fiscal authorities becomes ap-
parent every now and then, it is useful to view some options of how the policies could, 
in fact, be matched so that everyone ends up better off. The question is especially rele-
vant in the eurozone, since the ECB is famous for setting the inflation target at a low 
level. On the other hand, the national authorities are more focused on achieving endur-
ing and large-scale economic activity. On many occasions, the members have requested 
the central bank to ease its monetary policy and lower the interest rates. The disagree-
ments between the ECB and the fiscal authorities regarding key issues could end up 
worse for each party, providing ground for the fiscal constraints to be introduced. 
(Beetsma & Giuliodori 2010, 616.) 
The dispute is presented in the model by Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010, 616), 
providing reasoning for fiscal constraints and marching order in a monetary union. The 
illustration is based on the 2001 and 2003 versions by Dixit and Lambertini. Their mod-
el, in turn, is a form of the 1983 model by Barro and Gordon (Dixit & Lambertini 2003, 
238). Assume that a monetary union consists of n members. The output supply equation 
for a country i (i = 1, … , n) could then be formed as: 
 
 
     𝑦i   =   𝜓(𝜋 – 𝜋
e
)  +  ∑ 𝜙𝑛𝑗=1 ijxj , 𝜙ii  ≠ 0 
 
 
The xj in this context is the fiscal instrument. Inflation is assumed to be the same for 
every member of the union, and therefore holds no subscript. This equation can also be 
considered as the net effect for an inflation shock after the leveled off cross-border ef-
fects have annulled. A higher value for xj points to a more expansive level of fiscal poli-
cy. For instance, this could be interpreted as larger government consumption or a cut in 
distortionary taxation. This fiscal policy could exercise a positive or a negative effect, in 
which case the 𝜙ij is unrestricted. The existence of these direct fiscal spillovers, howev-
er, does not have any qualitative significance over the outcome. (Beetsma & Giuliodori 
2010, 616-617.) 
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Deriving furthermore from Beetsma’s and Giuliodori’s (2010, 617) work, the infla-




    𝜋  =  𝜇  +  𝛾 ∑ 𝑥𝑛𝑗=1 j ,  𝛾  ≠  0 
 
 
The parameter 𝛾 could be either positive or negative. A supply-part fiscal expansion 
pulls down the inflation level (𝛾 ˂ 0), whereas the demand-part generates the exact op-
posite (𝛾 ˃ 0). Furthermore, the loss functions for the fiscal policymaker (F) in member 
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𝛼4i , 𝛼5i  ˃  0. 
 
 
Among the most important aspects regarding eventual results, and the consideration of 
fiscal restrictions, is whether or not the different policymakers are able to reach unanim-
ity on output and inflation levels. In case they are able to reach consensus, that is, ?̃?M = 
?̃? 𝐹
𝑖
, ∀i, and ?̃? 𝑀
𝑖
 = ?̃? 𝐹
𝑖
  ˃  0, ∀i, it produces (n+1) objectives (n levels for output and one 
for inflation), as well as an even amount of policy instruments. Each of the best possible 
response functions intersect at the same point, with the ideal levels for output and infla-
tion coming out as equilibrium outcomes. The outcome is gained in every case, even if 
the central bank fails to carry out the procedures they have declared. If the central bank 
does not perform, the gain is also achieved despite the timing of the authorities’ actions 
in placing policy acts, and whether or not the actions are coincident or happening suc-
cessively. (Beetsma & Giuliodori 2010, 617.) 
The central bank, however, foresees that the fiscal policies could always be adjusted 
to meet the targets for output, and as the first mover adjusts the money growth so that 
the inflation meets its target value. These adjustments of course take into account the 
expected selections of fiscal policies. The central bank is also able to adjust its monetary 
policy to meet the inflation target in case it is the last mover. On the other hand, aware 
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of the expected inflation level, and foreseeing the central bank’s choice in policy, the 
national fiscal decision makers always pick their policy so that the output targets are 
fulfilled. The presence of cross-border spillovers does not, however, directly mean that 
fiscal coordination problems arise. All of the objectives are achieved, even if the nation-
al fiscal policymakers are not able to organize their cooperation properly. (Beetsma & 
Giuliodori 2010, 617.) 
The aforementioned favorable result becomes irrelevant, if the authorities fail to 
reach agreement regarding outcomes in their policies. In a more realistic manner, as-
sume that the European Central Bank acts more conservatively than any of the respec-
tive fiscal authorities. In other words, the favored national output level for each fiscal 
policymaker is higher than for the ECB (?̃? 𝐹
𝑖
 ˃ ?̃? 𝑀
𝑖
, ∀i) and the favorable level for infla-
tion is lower for the ECB than any of the fiscal policymakers (?̃? 𝐹
𝑖
 ˃ ?̃?M, ∀i). Further-
more, assume that 𝛼5i ˂ 𝛼4i / n, ∀i, and 𝛾 and 𝜙ii are positive. With these parameters 
taken into consideration, and the expectations on inflation constructed, the respective 
actors are now moving concurrently. The result is a Nash game, where one party is con-
ducting fiscal expansion that targets larger output, and the other focuses on monetary 
control in order to flatten the effect of fiscal expansion on inflation, and vice versa. The 
game results in a situation where all the actors are well worse off than their desired posi-
tions. Output for each of the fiscal actors is above the preferred level, whereas the infla-
tion is lower than the ECB’s preferred level. Needless to say, this result is socially un-
acceptable. If output remains on a too high level, the economy may end up overheated, 
which in turn causes instability in macroeconomic circumstances. On the other hand, if 
the inflation level remains too low, the risk for deflation is present. If the parties disa-
gree about the objectives regarding policies, this broadens the amount of targets that lie 
beyond the amount of instruments that are actually available. This in turn suggests that 
some targets are unreachable. (Beetsma & Giuliodori 2010, 617-618.) 
Different means to avoid extreme outcomes in policy can be perceived, however. 
Among these is the better orientation of targets between the monetary and fiscal poli-
cymakers. Better orientation is relatively easy for the central monetary authority, 
whereas it is considerably harder for the fiscal authorities. National governments often 
have to operate in interaction with the voters and interest groups, which in turn favor a 
high level of economic drive. One possible solution, and a more realistic one, is to ap-
point either the monetary or the fiscal authority as the game’s leader. The leading side 
foresees the action of the second mover, and chooses a more moderate approach. This 
encourages the second mover to choose a more moderate approach as well. It is useful, 
however, to consider the European Central Bank to assume the leader position. From 
this, a third and supplementary option can be obtained. The option comprises of imple-
menting fiscal constraints on the national fiscal policies, which in turn persuades the 
fiscal authorities to choose a more moderate policy position. This also exempts the ECB 
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from its need to conduct contractionary policy. In effect, by applying fiscal limitations 
on the national authorities, the central bank can effectively be placed in the leader’s 
status. This is also a component that has been considered for the Stability and Growth 
Pact to assume. (Beetsma & Giuliodori 2010, 618.) 
 
2.2.2 A Model by Chari and Kehoe 
 
Varadarajan V. Chari and Patrick J. Kehoe (2007) have also studied fiscal constraints 
in their work, with the emphasis being on the commitment of the central monetary au-
thority. They stress, that in case the monetary policymaker is able to commit to its 
promises, the possible fiscal limitations will not enhance welfare. On the other hand, the 
constraints increase welfare in case the monetary authority fails to commit to its objec-
tives. Another of the principal features of their work is the time inconsistency problem. 
If present in the monetary decision making, it may lead to a fiscal free-rider problem. 
The roots of this problem lie in the monetary authority’s incentive to inflate nominal 
debt. If the monetary decision maker does not commit to its future objectives, the opti-
mum procedure for a benignant monetary authority is to place the inflation target higher 
when the debt levels of the members are high, and lower when the corresponding debt 
levels are low. The residents of all the member states affect the cost of the inflation. As 
the fiscal policymaker in a member country is preparing to issue debt, it has to take into 
account that the monetary authority increases the inflation rate when the debt level rises. 
The fiscal authority also bears in mind that the costs of the altered inflation affect its 
own citizens, but dismisses the costs this action may have on the other members of the 
union. This so-called free rider problem causes inefficiency, as each of the fiscal poli-
cymakers ends up issuing too much debt, and at the same time, the inflation rate keeps 
climbing higher. Hence, declaring constraints on the debt levels that each member may 
issue, all members end up in a better position. (Chari & Kehoe 2007, 2400.) 
In case the time inconsistency problem could somehow be resolved, the free-rider 
problem would disappear as well. This, in turn, indicates that the fiscal constraints de-
crease welfare. In the model, the authors assume that the only way to clear the time in-
consistency problem is to presume that the monetary authority can commit to its pro-
posals. The concept that different groups, for example the actors of the common curren-
cy union, have problems with free riding in either static or commitment models, is not 
exactly a new innovation. The authors, however, express a new way of free-riding, a 
feature that only arises when time inconsistency is present. This problem could be 
solved by setting a relevant limitation on debt level. The consistency of how these limi-
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tations could counter the problem quite clearly advocate the fiscal limitations made by 
the drafters of the EMU Treaties. (Chari & Kehoe 2007, 2400.) 
The outcome is enlightened in a setting that includes a reduced-form benchmark 
model that consists of two periods. In the first section, the fiscal authorities of the mem-
ber states issue nominal debt to risk-neutral lenders that do not live in the union. In the 
second phase, the central monetary authority of the currency union declares the inflation 
target. The output in the second phase is presumed to be a diminishing function of the 
inflation value. This means that the monetary authority must balance between the ad-
vantage of nominal debt devaluation and the costs of reducing output. As discussed ear-
lier, the monetary authority intends to set the inflation target in relation to the amount of 
debt. The high rate of inflation materializes, in case some procedure to control public 
debt is unavailable. Therefore, if the monetary authority fails to commit, all other mem-
bers are worse off when one of the members decides to issue more debt. The problem 
indicates, that debt levels in an equilibrium that does not cooperate, are dissimilar to 
those in an equilibrium that cooperates. The problem again vanishes when the monetary 
authority is able to commit to its objectives. (Chari & Kehoe 2007, 2400.) 
The theory aims to provide a sensible ground for fiscal limitations in the EMU. One 
could interpret, that based on the pacts of the union, the monetary policy in the eurozone 
is conducted successively by majority rule. In a position like this, the time inconsistency 
problem could be difficult, which in turn makes the existence of fiscal limitations desir-
able. The analysis of the authors accompanies the developers of the monetary union in 
the view that commitment to monetary policy could prove to be difficult. Hence, includ-
ing the debt constraints as vital parts in the statutes was a good decision. From another 
point of view, the number one goal for the central monetary authority, the price stabil-
ity, secures commitment to coming monetary policy, and this way also settles the time 
inconsistency problem. From this point of view, the debt limitations are unreasonable 
and detrimental. (Chari & Kehoe 2007, 2401.) 
The model also provides a new perspective regarding the analysis of the countries 
where governments operate under significant freedom of setting the national fiscal poli-
cy. The theory proposes, that in monetary unions like these, unsettled time inconsisten-
cy issues lead to high inflation rates and wasteful fiscal decisions. The authors mention 
Argentina as one significant example, where the time inconsistency problem causes 
issues. The monetary policy becomes erratic, as the central government is unable to 
place binding restrictions on the provincial equivalents. The provincial authorities run 
excessive deficits continuously, which end becoming liabilities for the central bank. In 
1991, the Argentine Currency Board pegged the peso to the United States dollar in the 
hopes of decreasing wasteful fiscal behavior. In the end the plan was not successful, 
even though some proof that the deficits among the Argentine provincial governments 
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fell, was found. In this case, the changes in law were not able to settle the time incon-
sistency problem. (Chari & Kehoe 2007, 2401.) 
Consider the government of a member country i (i = 1,…,n) that maximizes utility 
u(Ci1) + u(Ci2) of its represented consumers. This comes over the consumption levels 
Ci1 and Ci2 in periods 1 and 2, and is relative to the following budget constraints: 
 
Ci1 = Y1 + Bi, and 
 
Ci2 = Y(𝜋) – (1 + Ri)Bi/(1 + 𝜋) 
 
In the above, the Yi is the initial benefaction, Ri is the nominal interest rate and Bi is the 
amount of government issued debt that is not indexed. The model contains no discount-
ing, and the initial price level is normalized to unity. This in turn implies that Bi also 
represents the real amount of debt issued in period 1. Moreover, Y(𝜋) is three times 
continuously differentiable and strictly concave, with the maximum reached at zero in-
flation level. Therefore, Y´(𝜋) ˂ 0 when 𝜋 ˃ 0. Notice, that Y1 is sufficiently greater 
than Y(0), in order for the governments to borrow in period 1. The real debt with inter-
est repayment is represented by the last term of the second period consumption expres-
sion. Profits are minimal due to the large amount of risk-neutral investors buying the 
debt. Therefore, they are willing to buy debt if: 
 
(1)  (1 + R)/(1 + 𝜋) = 1 
 
where R ≡ R1 = … = Rn represents the common rate of interest. (Beetsma & Giuliodori 
2010, 621.) 
The model is next solved in a backwards fashion. First, as the central bank is not able 
to commit, it moves last and maximizes with a given R over 𝜋 the average second peri-







𝑖=1   [Y(𝜋) – (1 + R)Bi / (1 + 𝜋)] 
 
We assume a symmetric equilibrium, and the first-order condition using (1) is: 
 





  ∑ 𝐵𝑛𝑖=1 i 
 
From (2) it can be seen that the inflation rate is growing in average union debt, repre-
sented by ?̅?. Therefore, 𝜋 =  𝜋(?̅?) can be written with 𝜋´ ˃ 0. Significantly, the effect 
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caused by an increase in any specific country i’s debt on currency union’s inflation is 
reduced by the size of the union n, representing the origin of the fiscal free-riding prob-
lem. (Beetsma & Giuliodori 2010, 621.) 
Getting to know the game more thoroughly, the government i maximizes u(Y1 + Bi) 
+ u[Y(𝜋(?̅?)) – Bi] over Bi. This suggests that: 
 
(3)  u´(Y1 + Bi) = [1 + 
1
𝑛
 Γ(𝜋)] × u´(Y(𝜋) – Bi) 
 
Here, Γ(𝜋) ≡ Y´(𝜋)/[Y´(𝜋) + (1 + 𝜋)Y´´(𝜋)], using the expression for 𝜋´(?̅?) derived 
from (2). For given inflation rate, Bi is growing in the size of the union n. Moreover, 
with Y´´(𝜋) and Y´´´(𝜋) sufficiently close to 0, it is clear that a larger currency union 
indicates larger average debt and higher inflation rate in the equilibrium. (Beetsma & 
Giuliodori 2010, 621-622) 
An individual government usually plays down any negative spillovers, and comes to 
realize that the cost for an individual fiscal expansion, measured by higher inflation and 
lower national output, is smaller in a larger currency union. Derived from this, fiscal 
policy is more expansive and inflation higher in a currency union, and even more in a 
large union, compared to the national side conducting independent monetary policy. 
The result is, that if the central monetary authority does not commit to its objectives, 
setting restrictions on public debt levels is favorable, since the effects of free riding 
could this way be effectively eliminated. (Beetsma & Giuliodori 2010, 622.) 
Continuing further, the governments now move last and choose debt in order to max-
imize for given inflation rate u(Y1 + Bi) + u(Y(𝜋) – Bi), taking into account the imposed 
(1). This way debt becomes the function Bi(𝜋) = (
1
2
)(Y(𝜋) – Y1) of inflation. Along with 











 (Y1 + Y(𝜋))] 
 
In the above, the optimum is reached at 𝜋 = 0. In case of commitment, the chosen debt 
level Bi(𝜋) is no longer a function of the size of the union, disabling the free riding 
problem in the process as well. The debt is now chosen last, and as a function of infla-
tion it has the same level as in the case of autonomy. This indicates that also inflation in 
the currency union is the same as under autonomy. Note that the first order condition for 
maximizing (4) accords to the equivalent condition in case of autonomy, thus assuming 
that commitment stands. As a result, since in case of commitment the only existing dis-
tortion has been eliminated, social welfare in terms of utility of the representative con-
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sumer gains its highest level, rendering debt restrictions needless. (Beetsma & Giulio-












3 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENT IN DEBT AND DEFICIT 
LEVELS 
 
Joining a common monetary union includes certain deeds and responsibilities, the 
Eurozone being no exception. In order to be eligible for a monetary union, an applicant 
needs to provide results of fiscal convergence. These convergences in question were 
clarified in the previous chapter in terms of the Maastricht criteria. These requirements 
provide a solid basis for this chapter, in which we review the fiscal performance of the 
member and applicant countries in relevant fields. First, we observe the government 
deficit and debt levels, which in contemporary media and literature tend to raise most 
discussion. A breakdown of the chapter also includes the twelve original users of the 
euro glanced separately from the seven newer participants. The original members in this 
context were Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, Portu-
gal, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Luxembourg, whereas Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta joined the union later. The twelve original mem-
bers began using the euro as their circulating currency in January 2002, with the first of 
the newer countries, Slovenia, transferring to euro in January 2007. 
 
 
3.1 THE ORIGINAL TWELVE SIGNATORIES 
3.1.1 Government deficit 
 
A nation interested in participating in the global loan markets has to pay attention to 
two main features, namely the interest rate value that it is required to pay to its debtors 
and the measures it has to go through to obtain enough export revenue to repay its debt. 
This brings us to the golden achievement of the European monetary community, in 
terms of lower debt costs, that makes it more lucrative to borrow than before the mone-
tary membership. Greater integration in goods markets, in turn, results in a more flexi-
ble demand for the nation’s goods. This lowers the price cuts needed in the future, and 
this way has a similar kind of effect. As a result, following greater integration the bor-
rowing countries will want to increase their borrowing. Distribution in current account 
balances therefore expands, as lending countries would obviously want to lend more. 
(Blanchard & Giavazzi 2002, 149.) A commonly referred cause for the crisis in the Eu-
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rozone is the high amount of debt and deficit following the common monetary union. 
The global crisis worsened the issue, with a serious problem in the peripheral countries 
eventually spreading to the entire euro area (Allen & Ngai 2012, 7). 
The 1990s was generally a decade of good fiscal performance, as the budget deficits 
systematically improved in the years after the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. 
As we explained in chapter 2, the Maastricht Treaty brought a requirement that limited 
the budget deficit level to 3% of the GDP. The 1990s was, however, a period of major 
fiscal improvements in many advanced economies. As a consequence, the weight and 
role of the Maastricht Treaty in refining the European fiscal framework at the time re-
mains somewhat a question. It is not considered far-fetched either that many countries 
aimed to improve their fiscal approach in light of the upcoming monetary union.  The 
economic pace was, however, very desirable from the EMU point of view. This, along 
with the fears that some members would misuse the system, lead to the creation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, aimed to control the national budget imbalances on an even 
larger scale. Although there has been much speculation that the Pact has been an unsuc-
cessful case, there is evidence that the Pact has managed to be a valid reference point 
for the smaller member countries. (Lane 2006, 62.) 
The latter part of our analysis is characterized by the still ongoing financial crisis. 
Cynically put, the euro was at the height of its success in the mid-2000s, at least so far. 
A thorough bond market along with much alike government debt spreads and the status 
as a major reserve currency deemed the euro a prominent success story. Popularity and 
interest towards the monetary community was widespread in the European Union. A 
change came in the form of the financial crisis, which started in 2007. A significant turn 
of events came with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, which lead to 
major recessions and fierce budget deficits across the continent. Many banks were fac-
ing difficulties after property bubbles burst in Ireland and Spain, to name a few. At the 
end of 2009 it became clear that Greece was facing serious problems, and in May 2010 
it became the first euro country to look for help from the IMF and European Union. 
Ireland followed soon after in November 2010, as did Portugal in April 2011. In 2012, 
these were followed by Spain and Cyprus. (Allen & Ngai 2012, 6.) 
Presented in tables 3 and 4 below are the government deficits and surpluses, as per-




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Analyzing tables 3 and 4 provides us with a few noticeable features. First, an evident 
pattern can be distinguished during the initial years of the monetary cooperation. From 
1993 to the physical creation of the euro in 1999, the deficit levels decreased signifi-
cantly. Whereas in 1995, the first year of available data for every original member, the 
average deficit was -5.9%, in 1999 the corresponding figure was -0.7%. Even though 
the figure was slightly higher when the euro started circulating in 2002, it would not be 
beyond satisfactory in terms of criteria and rules accepted during the previous decade. 
The members were generally able to reach satisfactory ratios at the time of the imple-
mentation of the euro. 
A few noteworthy cases can be distinguished from the era of build-up to the euro. A 
special notion can be given to Belgium which was able to continuously reduce its deficit 
ratio from 1993 to 2001, and reached the acceptable limits on every year of our observa-
tion before 2009. The progression is similar in case of Belgium’s debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Another conspicuous feature is Greece’s situation. The table implies that the deficit-to-
GDP ratio was never even close to the required 3% level. Indeed, a lot can be attributed 
to the fact that the Greek officials continuously understated the country’s debt and defi-
cit levels. This played a crucial role during the EMU qualification years, as well as the 
initial years of the Economic and monetary Community. Hence, it is nearly impossible 
to distinguish actual effects of the Stability and Growth Pact on the Greek records, both 
before and after it joined the Economic and Monetary Community. (Buiter 2006, 690, 
703.) 
In 1995, values as high as -10.2% were measured in case of Greece. Countries such 
as Germany and the Netherlands were running a deficit worse than -9%, and many 
countries experienced a deficit level of -5% or lower. In 1995, only Ireland and Luxem-
bourg met the criterion of excessive deficit. Of these, Luxembourg was the only country 
to accumulate surplus. However, as mentioned before, the latter part of the 1990s was a 
period of steady economic growth and positive outlook. By 1999, the heavy deficits 
were largely gone, and many countries were instead running surpluses. In 1999, Ireland, 
Finland and the Netherlands had joined the surplus club. In addition, Greece and Portu-
gal were the only countries not able to reach the deficit criterion. Partly because of the 
miscalculated records provided, Greece was permitted to join the third stage of the euro 
as the twelfth member in 2001. 
At the time of the physical implementation of the euro in 2002, the situation was for 
the most part unaltered. Even though the numbers were not greatly above the limit, 
Germany, France and Italy were running excessive deficits. This was annoying especial-
ly from Germany’s point of view as the new central bank, along with its guiding rules, 
was largely founded on the basis of the former German Bundesbank. As Buiter (2006, 
703) writes: “Embarrassment among one’s peers in Ecofin or in the Eurogroup is an 
especially weak deterrent if one has company.” In the end, measures provided by the 
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Stability and Growth Pact were stretched to enable the three largest euro countries to 
continue with their domestic agendas (Buiter 2006, 703). 
Whereas the turn of the millennium and subsequent years proved to be a slight down-
turn, the years between 2005 and 2007 provided an improvement in deficit ratios. As 
more tranquil years before the hard-hitting financial crisis, the average deficit value 
improved from -1.8% in 2005 to -0.8% in 2006, and further to -0.2% in 2007. By 2007, 
only Greece was running excessive deficit, and many countries had accumulated sur-
pluses. In addition to Greece, Portugal, France, Austria and Italy had deficits in the first 
place. 
2008 saw the first surge in deficit levels, as the effects of the financial crisis began to 
take their toll. Only Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland had surpluses. Portugal, 
France, Spain, Greece and Ireland had a deficit level of worse than -3%. Notably, the 
year 2008 was the first major downfall year for Ireland with a digit of -7%, as it was 
suffering heavily from the burst of the property bubble. Spain followed soon after, as 
did Portugal. From 2009 to 2012, Spain recorded values of around -10%, with 2009 
being the highest with a value of -11%. Portugal had similar figures, with a high of -
11.2% in 2010. Greece was also on its usual path, with double-digit figures on every 
year from 2008 to 2011, as well as in 2013. Ireland has the questionable honor of hav-
ing the worst deficit of any euro country in history with a figure of -32.3% in 2010, re-
sulting from the bailout packages assembled for the Irish financial institutions. Ireland 
has, however, recovered well after the collapse, since the deficit level had improved to -
3.9% in 2014. 
The crisis hit every member country severely, and in 2014, Luxembourg was the on-
ly member not to have violated the deficit rule since the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. In 2014, Finland experienced its first breach of the deficit rule since 1996. Even 
though the situation has improved substantially since the beginning of the crisis, many 
countries, most notably Spain and Portugal, were facing high deficit levels and continue 
to do so. In case of the larger euro countries, the situation was slightly more restrained. 
Germany experienced a deficit of -4.2% in 2010, but after that it has had relatively quiet 
series of near-zero deficits and surpluses. Of the larger countries, France had the biggest 
deficit, -7.2% in 2009. After that, the pattern has been improving every year. Italy expe-
rienced a deficit of -5.3% in 2009, but after that its values have been very close to the 
3% threshold. On average, the deficit levels have continuously dropped on five straight 
years since 2010, similar to a situation in the 1990s when Europe was preparing for the 
new currency union. 
In the introduction, we presented a research question of how the requirements in the 
Maastricht criteria have changed after a country joins a monetary union. After the anal-
ysis, we can now proceed to answer in terms of national government deficit. The deficit 
values were generally improving in the 1990s, before experiencing a slight setback in 
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the turn of the millennium, as the euro was being physically introduced. The situation 
was again improving in the first half of the 2000s, before experiencing a significant turn 
to worse due to the financial crisis. The situation has once again improved in the recent 
years, with the average values improving on a yearly basis. In 2014, every country 
among the original members except Portugal had a better deficit value than their corre-
sponding values in 1993, at the time of the Maastricht Treaty. Of the time frame ob-
served, the situation was best in the year 2000. During the years between the start of 
circulation and financial crisis, the deficit levels seem to have developed positively. 
 
 
3.1.2 Government debt 
 
Another widely observed feature in government activity is its consolidated gross 
debt. A direct consequence of running a governmental budget deficit, this cause and 
effect relationship forms an integral part of a monetary union. Assume that a member 
country chooses to run a path of deficit instead of making corrective adjustments to its 
budgetary policy. The member ends up creating negative spillovers, which affects other 
members in the monetary union. A country with a worsening debt-to-GDP ratio has to 
increasingly rely on capital markets, which in turn raises the interest rate for the entire 
monetary union. This leads to a pressure in other member countries’ debts as well. If 
other members choose to run consistent debt-to-GDP ratios, they need to conduct more 
reserved fiscal policy. Hence, if one country chooses to run a higher debt-to-GDP ratio, 
it compels the other members to conduct a more deflationary policy. (De Grauwe 2005, 
230.) 
Following are tables 5 and 6, which contain debt-to-GDP ratios for the twelve mem-
bers of the original start date of 2002. As in the previous subchapter, the data has been 
collected from Eurostat. As could be predicted, similar occurrences to the deficit levels 
recur here as well. The guiding themes are again improved levels after the Maastricht 
Treaty, relative stagnation around the turn of the millennium and worsening debt levels 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Let us again start from the beginning of the deepening integration, in other words the 
halfway point of the 1990s. Looking at the tables 5 and 6, we can explain that the aver-
age debt level was decreasing on eight consecutive years from 1995 to 2002. A general 
economic upturn can be attributed to this case as well, as can be the increased political 
attention to the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty (Lane 2006, 61-62). However, the aver-
age debt level was not within the acceptable 60% range of the GDP before the year 
2000. In 1995, Luxembourg, Finland, Germany, France and Portugal satisfied the 60% 
criterion. On average, the situation was best in the year 2002, when the average amount 
of debt was 56.8% of the GDP. In 2000 and 2001, all countries except Belgium, Italy 
and Austria met the criterion. Again, a special praise can be attributed to a few nations 
for conducting sustainable fiscal policy. Both Belgium and Ireland were able to contin-
uously decrease their debt ratios from 1995 to 2006, and Belgium in 2007 as well. Also 
decreasing its debt significantly was Italy, from 116.9% in 1995 to 100.0% in 2004, and 
99.7% in 2007. Greek data is missing between 1995 and 2005, but Buiter (2006, 701) 
presents that the level was over 100% of the GDP on every year of the above-mentioned 
time range. Furthermore, Frankel (2015, 429) presents that the debt level was never de-
creasing towards the required 60% of the GDP level. 
The period between the implementation of the euro and the beginning of the financial 
crisis was, again, sustainable from the fiscal point of view. On average, the debt levels 
were within the acceptable limit from 2000 to 2007. The debt levels generally decreased 
or stayed roughly the same from 2002 onwards, but a few exceptions can be distin-
guished. Adapting to their deficit values, the debt levels of France and Germany were 
rising during the first years of the euro as a physical currency. The values recovered 
only a few percentage points before the outbreak of the financial crisis. The Nether-
lands, Finland and Spain were able to reduce their government debt levels more signifi-
cantly, with Spain reducing its debt level from 51.3% in 2002 to 35.5% in 2008, a re-
duction of over 15 percentage points during that period.  
The outbreak of the financial crisis in 2007 saw a fierce rise in national debt levels, 
similar to the worsening deficit levels. The year 2008 was already beyond the accepta-
ble limit of 60%, with the average debt level nearing 100% in 2014. In 2008, Finland 
was the only nation able to reduce its debt from 2007. Hardest hit were Luxembourg 
and Ireland, which saw increases of 100% and 77.4% in a single year, respectively. Ex-
periencing its low of 23.6% in 2006, Ireland witnessed its debt increase to over fivefold 
in 2012 and 2013, before turning to decrease again in 2014. Other countries, especially 
in southern Europe, also suffered greatly from the recession. Spain, having an honorable 
level of 35.5% in 2007, saw its debt increase to 99.3% of GDP in 2014. Italy, experienc-
ing a significant decrease from 1995, witnessed an increase of over 30 percentage points 
to 132.3% in 2014. Portugal, not among the gainers during the first years of the mone-
tary union, also had a soaring debt during the period from 2007 to 2014. Its debt level 
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increased from 68.4% to 130.2%. The worst suffering was again Greece, where the 
government debt increased from 103.1% in 2007 to 178.6% in 2014. 
Small signs of hope can be distinguished, however, during the most recent years. The 
change in average debt level from 2013 to 2014 was around 0.8%, whereas the change 
in 2013 was 3.6%, and 5.2% in 2012. Besides Ireland, also Germany and Luxembourg 
were able to decrease their general government debt level from 2013 to 2014. In addi-
tion to Luxembourg, only Finland had a debt level below 60% in 2014, though only by 
margin of a few decimals. During the period of our review, the debt levels have general-
ly followed the pattern set by the deficit levels, excluding the most recent years. The 
debt ratios had a downward direction after the Maastricht Treaty, up until the euro be-
gan circulating. On average, the ratios stayed around the same from 2001 to 2007. From 




3.2 THE NEWER AND POSSIBLE FUTURE MEMBER COUN-
TRIES 
 
The second subchapter provides us a view of the seven newer euro countries men-
tioned in the introduction of the chapter. It has been argued, that in addition to the eco-
nomic side, the enlargement has an even more important feature. It is very important on 
a political level, as it is seen to end the political separation in Europe (Breuss, Fink & 
Haiss 2004, 770). Indeed, the seven new member countries have a population totaling 
around 15 million (2012) and combined Gross National Income of about $265 billion 
(2012), which constitute around 4,5% and 2% of the Eurozone total, respectively. On 
the other hand, on the political side the official languages of the euro area increased by 
6. Following are tables 7 and 8, which summarize the government debt and deficit lev-









Tables 7 and 8: Government deficit and surplus from 2003 to 2014, and government 
consolidated gross debt from 2003 to 2014 for the seven new members, both as percent-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Observing tables 7 and 8 give us a good view of development in case of the newer 
countries. Note that unlike with the original twelve members, the seven newer adopted 
the euro separately from each other. All of the newer countries became members in Jan-
uary, with the entry years being different. As noted in the chapter introduction, Slovenia 
was the first new member in 2007, five years after the euro began its circulation. Cyprus 
and Malta joined in 2008, Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithu-
ania in 2015. We observe the debt and deficit levels starting from 2003. The tables indi-
cate a distinct message, as the newer member countries follow the rest of the world in 
terms of financial difficulties as well.  
On average, the debt and deficit levels decreased from 2003 until the beginning of 
the crisis, reaching the best figures around 2007. The debt and deficit figures differ from 
2007 onwards. Average deficit level reached its highest value of -6.1% soon after in 
2009, whereas the debt values have continued to climb ever since the beginning of the 
crisis. Difference between the old and new countries is also apparent. The deficit values 
have been around the same for the past few years, and while on a steady rise recently, 
the debt values on average are considerably better for the newer countries. 
Some specific cases among the new members can be distinguished as well. For ex-
ample, Estonia can be considered a good example of responsible fiscal policy. During 
the period of our observation, Estonia has not run excessive deficit, and its debt-to-GDP 
level only surpassed 10% in 2014. For the majority of the period, Estonia was running 
surplus. As a matter of curiosity, Estonia has run excessive deficit only once during its 
entire time as an independent nation, a modest figure of around -3.5% in 1999. 
On the other side of the table, excessive deficit and debt-to-GDP values of over 60% 
have been common among other new member states. The worst deficit value of -15% 
was experienced by Slovenia in 2013. A near double-digit figures were also experienced 
by Latvia in 2009 and 2010, Lithuania in 2009 and 2011 and Malta in 2003. Among the 
debt-to-GDP ratios, Cyprus had the highest value, 108.2% in 2014. Apart from Cyprus 
and Malta, the debt values have been quite modest among the new members. In 2014, 
Slovenia was also running unacceptable debt ratio of 80.8%, having risen rapidly from 
the value of 53.7% in 2012. Hence, of the new members, the Baltic states and Slovakia 
were meeting the debt and deficit criteria in 2014. A less surprising fact is that like the 
original members before, every new member also focused on the deficit target before 
their respective entries. Taking into account their entry dates, every applicant had a 
moderate deficit ratio, or were even running surpluses before the following January. 
As mentioned before, three earlier members of the European Union opted to remain 
outside of the Eurozone. These are the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden. As of 
2016, no official statement has been given by these countries to join the euro in the near 
future, even though referendums are under consideration. Other European Union mem-
bers have, however, expressed interest in joining the euro sometime in the future. 
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Tables 9 and 10: Government deficit and surplus from 2005 to 2014 and government 
consolidated gross debt from 2005 to 2014 for the possible members, both as percentage 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































No official adoption dates or targets have been set, but some of these members could 
join the euro around 2020 at the earliest. This, of course, means that their currency must 
be pegged to the Exchange Rate Mechanism two years prior to the official entry date. 
Potential future members have been assembled in tables 10 and 11, which show the debt 
and deficit values for these nations. 
Interpretation of tables 9 and 10 becomes slightly different, as these potential mem-
bers lack the monetary union entry date. A common feature with the actual members 
can be distinguished, however. As with many others, these countries were also affected 
by the financial crisis. The figures follow the universal trend of worsening ratios from 
2007-08 onwards, with the leveling off during the last few years in the most cases. Of 
the countries presented in the tables, Czech Republic and Romania have the best overall 
performance regarding monetary union entry in the coming years, as both countries sat-
isfied the debt and deficit criteria. On the other hand, Croatia has emerged as the most 
unsatisfactory candidate with a deficit ratio of -5.6% and a debt ratio of 85.1%. Express-
ing anything conclusive is, however, premature as joining the euro in 2020 would re-




Taking into account the countercyclical nature of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the ratios 
have tended to rise during economic downturns and lower when an upturn takes place 
(Cafiso, 2012). In fact, public finances are often likely to worsen in case of a recession 
because of the existence of automatic stabilizers. These stabilizers, mostly in form of 
alterations in government spending and taxes, work to smoothen the negative effects on 
the economy. One good example is the income tax: When an individual loses his or her 
job, the dual effect consists of lost income tax, as well as a larger social benefit for the 
person recently unemployed. Other sectors of the economy, in form of corporations and 
consumption, are affected too when a recession takes place. Gains from enterprise taxa-
tion decrease as profits diminish and companies close down, and value-added taxes 
lower through smaller consumption. All of these features prominently affect national 
fiscal policies. (Holland, Barrell, Fic, Hurst, Liadze, Orazgani & Whitworth 2010, F13.) 
Jacopo Cimadomo (2011, 24) discusses about the potential causes for fiscal prob-
lems. First of these, namely fiscal counteractions implemented by policy makers, deep-
ens the effects of the automatic stabilizers. The size of these fiscal packages, coordinat-
ed by the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), rose to around 1.1% of GDP in 
both 2009 and 2010. This, however, leaves out the effects made at the European Union 
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level. The third point in the author’s article stresses other factors that not necessarily 
depend on the contemporary cycle. These include, among others, trends in consumption 
and unforeseen shortfalls in revenues. 
While the aforementioned three factors form the main point of attention, Cimadomo 
(2011, 24) also mentions the packages aimed to rescue troubled financial institutions. 
The effects of these packages mainly affected the national debt-to-GDP ratios, with the 
effects rising to 2% of GDP in 2008 and 2.5% in 2009. Most famous cases of financial 
sector support packages included the bailout of Royal Bank of Scotland by the British 
government in 2008, financial aid to multiple institutions in Ireland by the Irish gov-
ernment in 2008, and the takeovers of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae by the United 
States federal government in 2008. Financing troubled banks and other institutions has 
been, as presented before, one reason that the national debt ratios have increased faster 
than the deficit values would have us presume. One must also remember, that a country 
might be able to sell its shares in financial institutions, even with a margin of profit, if 
the institution manages to regain profitable levels of operation (Attinasi, Leiner-
Killinger & Slavik 2010, 49). 
Large deficits and public debts have a rich history in the eurozone. In many cases, it 
was the oil crisis of the 1970’s that started the trend of worsening debt and deficit ratios. 
Combined with limited and poor behavior of the national ruling parties, this has often 
been cited as one of the main reasons behind the deterioration of public finances. Since 
political defectiveness takes place in practically any country, one could ask why fiscal 
restrictions were introduced only in the process of the introduction of the common cur-
rency (Beetsma & Giuliodori 2010, 618.) In the same work, the authors discuss that the 
answer is the already poor conduct of fiscal policy. In this case, the unification would 
make the negative spillovers even worse, or possibly cause completely new spillovers 
and problems. 
Other reasons behind poor public finances can be distinguished as well. For example, 
Portugal was running a serious deficit in the 1970’s and the 1980’s, which had even 
deeper roots in history. The country was suffering from the collapse of its dictatorship, 
as well as the independence of its former colonies in Africa. These factors, along with 
poor political procedures were essential reasons in losing the control of national fiscal 
policy. The budget deficit at this time was exceeding 12% of the GDP. The deficit was 
only removed after the national currency, the escudo, was devalued by more than 60% 
between the years 1980 and 1987. (Blanchard & Giavazzi 2002, 147.) In many cases, 
the public debt has been in continuous increase during the last 30 – 40 years (Fincke & 
Greiner 2012, 3717). 
In any case, the outlook of public finances in Europe is in a serious situation. With 
the continuously increasing debt, sustainability can hardly be proclaimed. Taking into 
account the figures we viewed in this chapter, the reasoning for fiscal restrictions seems 
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obvious. Even though the average deficit has been improving since 2011, the value is 
still in excess of the needed 3%. Even if the countries in trouble managed to gain sur-
plus from now on, it would take years, possibly even more to get the finances in a satis-
factory situation. The importance of fiscal restrictions, as stated before, cannot be 
judged against, and the content of the restrictions hardly either. Even though the 60% 
debt restriction seems to originate from the average debt around the time of the drafting 
of the Maastricht Treaty, and therefore holds no official scientific foundation (De 
Grauwe 2005, 148), a relatively strict and earnest debt rule is in place. The following 



























4 INTERPRETATION AND CONCLUSIVE REMARKS 
 
The aforementioned authors, Attinasi, Leiner-Killinger and Slavik also planned an 
interesting scenario (2010, 49-51) aiming to forecast future debt and deficit levels with 
three different possible outcomes. The scenarios are presented below in figures 5 and 6, 
with the time frame up until the year 2030. The purpose of the forecast is to perceive the 





Figure 2: Three possible scenarios of overall budget balance for the euro area, as per-




Figure 3: Three possible scenarios of overall government debt for the euro area, as per-
centage of GDP. Source: Attinasi, Leiner-Killinger & Slavik, (2010, 50) 
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The possible outcomes are highlighted in different shapes and colors in the graphs. 
The green line, also sorted by dashes, supposes a swiftly stabilizing fiscal balances. The 
green scenario supposes a primary balance improvement of one percentage point per 
year, until a balanced fiscal stance is achieved in 2018. The blue line, sorted by dots, 
assumes a less successful path. In this option, the primary balance improves by 0.5 per-
centage points per year, until reaching the target in 2025. The red and smooth line, on 
the other hand, assumes no stabilization efforts at all. The balance remains at -3.7%, at 
the time the forecast for year 2010. (Attinasi, Leiner-Killinger & Slavik 2010, 49-51) 
The options presented in figure 5 lead to the results observable in figure 6. In option 
green, the debt levels peak at around 89% of GDP in 2013, while the blue option reach-
es its high of 97% of GDP in 2017. Furthermore, while the green option is the only one 
that eventually reaches the target level of 60%, the blue one also results in a more sus-
tainable and strengthened path in fiscal conduct. The red option, a highly undesired one, 
leads to a firm increase in government debt values. (Attinasi, Leiner-Killinger & Slavik 
2010, 49-51.) 
Armed with contemporary hindsight, it is quite obvious to state that the green option 
did not materialize. Even if we would decide to follow the blue path, a lot will need to 
be done to achieve this. As we remember from section 3.1.2. Germany was the only 
major economy in Europe to have a debt-to-GDP ratio that seemed to have turned to 
better. Even though the blue option is achievable, at the moment the red option seems 
more probable. In addition, we must consider the differences between the euro mem-
bers. Many of the members had high debt ratios and are more prone to larger deficits 
than other countries. The path to fiscal stabilization is also endangered by negative 
feedback, if higher government debt-to-GDP values lead to higher real interest rates and 
this way hamper economic recovery (Attinasi, Leiner-Killinger & Slavik 2010, 49-51). 
 
4.1 TREATMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT AND DEFICIT AND POS-
SIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
The conduct of fiscal policy has so far offered little aspiration. As illustrated in the 
following figures 4 and 5, and discussed in the earlier section, the public debt levels 
have been high in the historical context. The introduction of the euro in 1999 and 2002 
seemed to have little impact on the debt levels at the time, but the ratios have begun to 
climb in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The factual effects the monetary union has 
had on the member countries is almost impossible to declare, but the trend of the debt 




Figure 4: Government consolidated gross debt for the 12 original members, from 1995 




Figure 5: Government consolidated gross debt for the 7 newer and 6 possible members, 
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Jeffrey Frankel (2015, 429-433) presents three main reasons for the deterioration of 
public finance after the monetary unification, which work as possible solutions as well. 
First, Europe needs to deepen its cooperation among sectors that still work in the ab-
sence of monetary independence. Many economists had doubts over the monetary unifi-
cation in Europe, as the members were letting go of their capacity to react to asymmet-
ric shocks. Competitiveness in the peripheral areas of the union is crucial in order for 
the union to survive. A common problem in the periphery, especially during the first 
years of the monetary union, was the rising wages and unit labor costs in relation to the 
bigger and more central members. On the other hand, trade and current account balanc-
es accordingly worsened. At the time, growing deficits were explained with new capital 
flows, instead of badly worsening competitiveness. Crucial for the peripheral countries 
is to somehow cancel the trend of worsening unit labor costs, which for example could 
be done with wage reduction and productivity growth. Another option, using so-called 
“fiscal devaluation”, consists of raising Value Added Tax while at the same time the 
income tax would be lowered. This, however, could prove to be difficult. Increase in 
productivity would be difficult as well, since it could require a number of changes. 
These include for example demolishing existing bureaucratic obstacles and liberalizing 
labor markets. As a “positive” notion, these are features that should have been done in 
the first place, but were never implemented because of the crisis. Keynesians tend to 
point out that these supply sector changes usually take a long time before having any 
effect, but for example letting groceries stay open longer could have an immediate posi-
tive effect on employment. (Frankel 2015, 431-433.) 
Another solution has to do with better bank supervision, which only came to light 
when the financial crisis struck, since the drafters of the 1990’s Treaties paid very little 
attention to it. Whereas Greece is an example of fiscal catastrophe, Ireland could be 
considered a good example of banking crisis victims. Ireland’s struggle originates in the 
property bubble, which after bursting led the banking sector in trouble. Ireland was in 
need of a stricter monetary policy, but was unable to do so because of the common 
monetary supervision. The crisis was aggravated by the Irish government’s decision to 
bail out domestic banks, effectively transforming the crisis into a fiscal one as well. The 
banking supervision is the problem that has probably best been dealt with, since the 
supervision was eventually moved from national observers to the ECB, starting in 2012. 
Another good feature were the 2014 stress tests conducted by the European Bank Au-
thority, as well as the supplementing Asset Quality Review. (Frankel 2015, 429-431.) 
The third and probably the most difficult problem to fix is the fiscal moral hazard 
problem. A surprising fact in the early stages of the drafting of Maastricht Treaty was 
the attention paid to the fiscal limitations of the agreement. These were, as discussed 
before, the 3% and 60% limits on deficit and debt, as well as the bailout ban and subse-
quent Treaties, such as the Stability and Growth Pact. The drafters clearly had a vision 
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of how the new monetary union on the old continent could function, since the fiscal 
restrictions at that time were rarely mentioned in corresponding literature. As we have 
seen, the limitations still have had little or no effect on the fiscal behavior of the mem-
ber states. The criteria have been continuously breached by practically every member at 
some point, indicating that the SGP had little authority. Furthermore, as the spreads in 
the Mediterranean persisted in relation to Germany, the markets quite clearly believed 
that the central bank would in fact bail out any country that ended up in debt difficulties. 
In other words, even though the moral hazard problem was widely acknowledged, it 
was not focused on well enough. As many predicted before the worsening phase of 
2009-10, the recession was eventually harder because of fiscal austerity programs. Be-
cause of this, instead of improving, the debt ratios worsened even further. For some 
countries, the burden became so heavy that debt reductions were needed. One such ex-
ample is the write-down that was recently performed for Greece. Even this many years 
after the financial crisis struck, debt levels remain high, and colossal surpluses would be 





Figure 6: Government deficit and surplus from 1993 to 2014 for the original 12 mem-
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Figure 7: Government deficit and surplus from 2003 to 2014 for the 7 newer and 6 pos-
sible members, as percentage of GDP. Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
4.2 THE ROLE OF FISCAL RESTRICTIONS 
 
In the last subchapter, we ponder the role of the fiscal restrictions in the eurozone. 
We see no problem in a well-defined limitation with scientific background and material, 
which aims to guide fiscal policy. A political agenda changes often when an election is 
held, with different policy makers in charge from time to time. A permanent precept that 
reminds of a sustainable fiscal policy is in place, a good example being the debt limit of 
60% that has prevailed ever since the Treaty of Maastricht was first seen in the drawing 
table. A more prominent problem, however, is the execution of procedures that are to be 
activated whenever a member breaches the rules, and shows no intention of returning to 
sustainability. As seen in the previous chapter, many members remain on the worse sec-
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The eurozone remains a substantially diverse and frail economic zone, despite the 
fact that the area has seen countless alterations and improvements since the beginning of 
the financial crisis. One of the most prominent factors is the unique feature of a mone-
tary union, the common bond market after monetary unification. De Grauwe & Ji 
(2015) found evidence, that financial markets are more likely to treat monetary union 
member countries with more severity than others when facing difficulties. As discussed 
before, in addition to the financial sector, the institutions of the monetary union also 
impose limitations on the member states. Economic difficulties are also made more se-
vere because of the defectiveness of automatic stabilizers, which in turn is caused by 
panic that exacerbates austerity. This panic that may cause overreaction, usually hap-
pens during a time of recession and bad economic performance. De Grauwe & Ji (2015) 
found that the austerity was present in the eurozone, whereas in their sample of compar-
ison countries the phenomenon did not occur. (De Grauwe & Ji 2015, 413.) 
The path of austerity for currency union members itself is not complicated at all, but 
may turn out to be so in case panic and fear are the driving factors behind the decisions 
and outcomes. It goes without saying, that economy should be conducted from purposes 
other than primitive senses. Another implication is, that in case the markets force the 
euro area to adopt austere measures every time a recession takes place, the social and 
political foundation of the union could face a severe test. The procedure could also po-
tentially cause dissatisfaction among the citizens of the member states, since austere 
treatment only because you are part of a monetary union may feel unfair. (De Grauwe & 
Ji 2015, 413.) 
The two variables used in this thesis are the debt and deficit values, calculated as 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). When the debt-to-GDP ratio grows, the 
amount of debt grows as well and the cost of debt, in other words the loan servicing cost 
increases likewise. This in turn increases the risk of default for a sovereign state. A risk-
ier investment insists a larger risk premium, which the investors gain in form of a larger 
spread. Hence, an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio hints at a larger default risk, there-
fore justifying a limitation on the value. A similar effect can be derived from alterations 
in current account balance, represented by the deficit-to-GDP ratio. A deficit in current 
account means a net foreign debt of the member state in question. For the following 
cause, a worsening deficit-to-GDP ratio may be an indication of default as well: In case 
the net foreign debt is increasing because of the overspending of the country’s private 
sector, it obviously suggests that the private sector suffers from an increased default 
risk. This could prove to be detrimental for the policy makers as well, since problems in 
the economic activity lowers the governmental income. In other words, government 
revenues could turn to deficits if the economic scene suffers significantly. On the other 
hand, if the increase in net foreign debt derives from governmental overspending, the 
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government’s debt servicing costs are affected directly. This is another way to increase 
the national default risk. (De Grauwe & Ji 2014, 353.) 
Financial markets obtained vast responsibility in the process of European monetary 
unification, being able to push the monetary union members close to default during hard 
times. A significant change in the countries’ economic structure enabled the self-
fulfilling crises in liquidity to become more severe. In form of an own central bank, the 
countries were hard to push to limits before the monetary unification. De Grauwe & Ji 
(2014, 359) state in their work, that in a way, the monetary union members became 
emerging nations again, with the ability to issue debt gone. Another topic in the field of 
financial market effects is the loss of automatic stabilizers. A form of loss in independ-
ent policy making, the member states were forced to turn off the stabilizers when pres-
sured by the financial markets. This phenomenon became more visible in 2009, with the 
peripheral countries the most affected. When in dire need of balancing fiscal policy dur-
ing a difficult time, this measure was also largely out of order. De Grauwe & Ji (2014, 
359) reach a conclusion in their work, that the amount of fiscal discipline in the euro-
zone has been excessive. They state, that in a union where monetary power has already 
been transferred to someone else, also fiscal policy has been tightened considerably. 
This exercise of excessive fiscal monitoring has been prevalent from the start of the 
financial crisis. (De Grauwe & Ji 2014, 359.) 
The most prevalent understanding so far has been the thought, that a monetary union 
member must follow stricter budgetary discipline than a non-member. Two basic fea-
tures can be found behind this notion. The first one is the idea of moral hazard, or fiscal 
free riding. A monetary union member has an option to be financially bailed out by the 
central monetary authority. A special possibility like this thus requires special fiscal 
monitoring, that ensures proper fiscal conduct. The second feature is the common loan 
market, in which the member governments operate as equals. In this case, the gains 
from a lower interest rate may tempt the members to issue more debt than would be 
fiscally sound. In this case, fiscal restrictions would be useful as well. These procedures 
have ultimately led to the creation of well-designed fiscal agreements, such as the SGP. 
The financial crisis has further caused the pacts and agreements to be tightened. The so-
called two-pack and six-pack legislative practices have received increased control 
measures, while the member governments have agreed to include balanced budget sec-
tions in the national legislature. (De Grauwe & Ji 2014, 348-349.) 
A peculiar fact about the financial crisis is, that little evidence exists about the gov-
ernment inadequacy being the driving force in the crisis before 2008. As also suggested 
by our data from chapter 3, the government average debt was actually on the decrease 
back then. On the other hand, the household equivalent was climbing sharply. In this 
light, the creation of the common currency union did not cause the kind of spending 
spree that many experts and theorists predicted. Another peculiar fact is the absence of 
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all the fiscal control contracts, in addition to the SGP being much more lenient. Gov-
ernment conduct regarding fiscal policy was not monitored so closely during that time, 
yet the debt-to-GDP ratios were improving. The households, on the other hand, took 
care of the fiscal profligacy. (De Grauwe & Ji 2014, 349.) 
It was eventually noticed, that the main cause for the debt-to-GDP ratios to climb 
sharply was the private sector’s aspiration to rid itself of excessive debt it had accumu-
lated. Governments were forced to take control of the excessive debt in order to escape 
debt deflation dynamics. Nevertheless, the new budget measures focused more on the 
view that bad behavior of the governments was the main cause for the recession. De 
Grauwe and Ji (2014, 349) also point to the fact that the composition of the national 
governments’ debt character changed drastically. An independent monetarily before, the 
member was suddenly forced to issue debt in a currency that it couldn’t control. This 
led to a substantial change in the budget limitations of the members, but according to 
the authors, has not played any significant role in the discussion of monetary unions. 
(De Grauwe & Ji 2014, 349.) 
Severine Menguy (2015, 254) describes the budget outlooks for various eurozone 
members in her work, coming to different conclusions on the countries. She points to 
the low amount of debt for Finland and Luxembourg, describing these countries as quite 
fiscally healthy. Also Germany, Austria and the Netherlands are on the verge of satisfy-
ing the criteria mentioned in the Fiscal Compact. Moreover, Ireland, Belgium and 
France still have work to do in order to accomplish the targets. Italy, Spain, Portugal 
and Greece face the most difficult challenges. The author argues that very high growth 
rates are needed for these most indebted countries, in case one could even imagine the 
target to be achieved. The European restrictions and targets therefore appear quite far 
away in case of some members. An already perilous budgetary situation is hazardous 
when joining a monetary union, with the situation worsening even further. On the other 
hand, joining a monetary union would strengthen the situation of an already stable 
country. The author comes to a conclusion, that the austerity means taken by the Fiscal 
Compact could lead to a reduced growth, especially in the case of the smaller peripheral 
countries. In this situation, achieving sustainable and stable growth rates is the most 
crucial and important target in the eurozone. (Menguy 2015, 254.) 
Barry Eichengreen (2015, 416) discusses the possibility of restructuring debt in Eu-
rope, as already seen in case of Greece in 2012. Restructuring appears the only possibil-
ity, since running huge surpluses ten years straight seems quite far-fetched at this point. 
In fact, exceptional surpluses have been achieved only in special conditions during his-
tory. This includes the period of at least 10 years and surplus of at least 5%. Only three 
countries of the author’s sample, namely Belgium, Norway and Singapore, were able to 
achieve this, taking place in the 1990s and 2000s. Three features are prominent on ac-
tors that achieve these feats. First, they experience heavy pressure from the outside, fo-
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cusing on fiscal consolidation. Second, they feature strong institutions that are able to 
take care of common pool problems. Third, and most significantly, they are capable of 
maintaining economic growth, even in case they need to execute difficult fiscal consoli-
dation projects. The possibility of being able to devalue one’s currency has been an in-
tegral part of this in history (Eichengreen 2015, 417.) 
Debt restructuring was prominent, for example, in the case of Brady Plan in the 
1980’s, which ended the Latin American debt crisis at that time. Apart from Greece, 
which saw its debts restructured and transferred to the private sector back in 2012, the 
possibility of restructuring has not gained widespread popularity in the old continent. 
Even in the case of Greece, the authorities have declined to rearrange the part of Greek 
debt that is held by the European Union institutions, most prominently the European 
System of Central Banks, as well as bonds that are in the sphere of foreign governing 
law. In case the debts remain the way they are, Europe is quite likely to suffer from ill 
economic growth and weak levels of investment for a long time to the future. (Eichen-
green 2015, 417.) 
In a nutshell we could state, that at least the eurozone does not suffer from too igno-
rant fiscal supervision. The monetary union has been learning the hard way, but on the 
bright side, the experience is sure to give new perspective and writings on matters that 
are crucial in the everyday lives of the eurozone citizens. Even though the role of fiscal 
negligence in the recent surge of public debt is somewhat vague, we could conclude that 
the European monetary community is in need of fiscal limitations. By these limitations, 
I mean guidelines that are based on scientific evidence and experience, in addition to 
providing important backup in case a country or its current political decision makers 
become unaware or indifferent about the fiscal situation. The limitations should include 
exceptions, in case they threat the healthy growth that the currency area needs. To an-
swer the supplemental research question presented in the introduction, the role of fiscal 












In this thesis, we viewed the development of public debt and deficit, as well as the 
fiscal restrictions in the eurozone. We progressed through handling of the agreements 
and contracts that guide fiscal decision making in the currency union, namely the Maas-
tricht Treaty, Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Compact. The latter became ef-
fective in 2013, aimed at tightening the fiscal restrictions in the aftermath of the finan-
cial crisis. We then viewed a couple of theories that focused on the need of fiscal re-
strictions, before turning our attention to the development of debt and deficit in the 
Economic and Monetary Union. The thesis was concluded by the interpretative part 
which summarized the development of debt, deficit and the need of fiscal restrictions. 
The paths of public debt and deficit have had a two-edged development in the euro-
zone. The figures were developing in a positive manner after the Maastricht agreement 
in the early 1990s and the early stages of the new millennium, but turned to a sharp de-
cline after the financial crisis. The cause of the crisis lies in the private sector, yet the 
largest burden came upon the national governments. The governments suffer not only in 
terms of lost revenue, but also in terms of paying for the rescue of troubled institutions. 
After the introduction of the euro, the figures had a relatively positive path, but turned 
to worse because of the crisis. Some countries were hit harder than others, but all need 
to pay attention to keeping the fiscal figures in balance. 
The outcome clearly shows that the euro area is in a turning point, which deserves at-
tention. The debt levels have climbed ever since the crisis started in 2008, with no end 
in sight. The EMU authorities keep tightening the fiscal limitations, while the continent 
is still in the early stages of rediscovering its lost economic growth. The fiscal conduct 
deserves guidelines in order to avoid a disaster of the same scale that still prevails in 
Europe. A harmonious result between the respective actors is needed. It is a dilemma 
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